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 A In this paper a novel method have been proposed for expansion planning 
of generation and transmission that considered static security of the system 
such as voltage security margin And loadability limit. In the same study of 
expansion planning Security constraints of the system are neglected. In this 
study at the first step minimum singular value technique is used to evaluate 
voltage security margin and loadabolity limit, in order to select best bus for 
load incrimination. After it, in order to Supply the load, coordinated 
expansion planning of generation and transmission is needed, therefor the 
strategic interaction between transmission company (TransCo) and 
generation company (GenCo) for Transmission expansion planning (TEP) 
and generation expansion planning (GEP) in a competitive electricity market 
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Power system restructuring and deregulation, introduce new definitions and methods to the power 
system planning. In the monopoly power market, the decision maker is just one organization which decides 
for the Generation Expansion Planning (GEP) and Transmission Expansion Planning (TEP) altogether. Due 
to emergence of competition in the power market, the decision makers of GEP and TEP become separated 
such that the transmission company (TransCo) decides for TEP and the generation company (GenCo) decides 
for GEP. In such an environment, the coordination between these two organizations becomes more crucial as 
capacity expansion of each organization affects the other side capacity expansion and as a consequence the 
profit of each company is affected. In a competitive power market with open access to the transmission 
system, the generation company is expected to supply the load without any congestion in the transmission 
lines. Transmission companies are obliged to provide a congestion-free, reliable and non-discriminative path 
for the generation companies to the consumers of electricity. Therefore, the transmission networks must be 
regulated so that optimal operation of power system is performed. In a restructured power market, Genco 
decides on capacity, place and time of construction of new power plants at its own discretion. The capacity 
expansion strategy used by GenCo involves TransCo and produces uncertainty and challenges to TEP. On the 
other hand, there is no absolute certainty that a transmission network can provide sufficient capacity for new 
generation capacity constructed by a GenCo [1-5]. 
 This interaction between Genco and TranCo leads to a new method of GEP and TEP that considers 
both entities’ profit. In such an environment, Game theory seems to be a useful method to predict the 
strategies of Genco and TransCo for generation expansion capacity (GEC) and transmission expansion 
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capacity (TEC) and evaluate the power market equilibrium [6-10]. TEP and GEP have been studied 
separately in many articles but the interaction between them in a deregulated market is studied in a few 
papers. In [11] in order to study the relationship between generation and transmission investment, a three-
stage model is presented. A study in [12] shows that in a deregulated power market, the degree of 
competition between different generators is dependent on the capacity of transmission lines. The interaction 
between transmission and generation expansion planning using game theory, is studied in a three-bus system 
in [13]. To study the strategic interaction between GenCo and TransCo, a single-stage deterministic model is 
proposed in [14]. The expansion behaviors of both GenCo and TransCo are simulated using Cournot model. 
The equilibrium in the power market in [14] is obtained using Mixed Complementarity Problem approach 
and the proposed model is applied to a three-bus system and the IEEE 14-bus system.   
On the other hand, power system security which is the ability of the power system to withstand 
disturbances against any violation in system operating conditions should be considered in this new method of 
capacity expansion. The aforementioned studies in the field of generation and transmission expansion 
planning haven’t considered power system security. However in this paper, first the load pattern of a six-bus 
power system is improved and then the best bus for load increment is determined using a sensitivity 
characteristic of ANN. Afterwards the strategic interaction between transmission company (TransCo) and 
generation company (GenCo) for TEP and GEP in a competitive electricity market is proposed using Game 
Theory. It should be taken into consideration that the load discussed in this paper is a manageable load which 
can be increased or decreased using reward or penalty. The paper is organized as follows. In section II, the 
loadability limit as a security index is introduced. The neural network used for the improvement of load 
pattern is presented in section III. Application of Cournot model of duopoly for TEP and GEP is discussed in 
section IV. Section V proposes Game Theory for solving TEP and GEP problem.  A case study is presented 
in section VI. Finally, conclusions are presented in section VII.  
 
 
2. LOADABILITY LIMIT AND VOLTAGE SECURITY MARGIN AS A SECURITY INDEX 
In order to study the static voltage stability of the power system, loadability limit of system is 
proposed as voltage stability index for system security evaluation. Loadability limit of a power system is 
defined as the maximum load, which can be imposed on buses of a system without loss of voltage stability. 
the minimum singular value technique is used to evaluate voltage security margin for each state of loading. 
The minimum singular value of the load flow Jacobian matrix is obtained from solving the load flow 
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Where: 
     : Active power transfer from bus I; 
: Reactive power transfer from bus i; 
 : Voltages of bus i and bus j; 
    : Admittances from bus i to bus j; 
    : angle of impedances from bus i to bus j; 
    : Admittances from bus i to bus j; 
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P : Small deviation in active power; 
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1 4J J : Jacobian matrix elements of load flow equations; 
 : Small deviations in voltage angle; 
V : Small deviations in voltage magnitude. 
 
 
3. MINIMUM SINGULAR VALUE 
One of the effective methods of determination of voltage collapse point is minimum singular value 
of the load flow Jacobian matrix. In this paper, minimum singular value technique is used to selective best 
bus for loading. On This way load increases in desired bus when load is fixed at another bus then calculate 
voltage security margin with approach technique. When voltage security margin is calculated for all of the 
state, the state with maximum VSM is the best state for loading. Flowchart of this process has been shown in 
figure 1. Equation (3) can be written by equation (4). Under normal operating condition, application of 
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Where: 
n: number of buses in the power network,  
uj,vj : singular vectors that uj and vj are the  jth columns of unitary matrix,  : Positive real singular values. 
 
Above analysis clearly shows where the minimum singular value of the load flow Jacobian matrix is 
almost zero, this suitable indicator detects the closeness of power system operating condition to the voltage 
collapse point. 
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4. APPLICATION OF COURNOT DUOPOLY MODEL TO TEP AND GEP PROBLEM 
In the Cournot duopoly model, two companies produce a homogenous product and without knowing 
the decision of the other one, they must decide how much product they should produce to obtain the 
maximum profit [18]. As the Cournot model is somehow similar to the TEP and GEP behaviors, it can be 
applied to the problem of TEP and GEP in the restructured power market. The first similarity between the 
cournot model and TEP and GEP problem is the expansion capacity of TEP and GEP, which is quantity in 
Cournot model. The second similarity is that in a pool market the product of each generation unit is a 
homogenous product which is offered by GenCo at each supply bid. The Cournot model maximizes the profit 
of each company and defines the amount of their outputs. In terms of mathematical formulas, the optimal 
quantity pair * *1 2( , )q q is the Coumot equilibrium, if for firm 1, 
*
1q solves (10): 
 
*
1 1 2max ( , )q q  (10) 
 
Where: 
i  : Profit for firm i; i=1, 2; 
iq   : Quantities produced by firm i; 
*
iq : Optimal quantities produced by firm. 
 
The profit function for firm 1 can be represented by (11): 
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1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1( , ) ( ) ( )q q p q q q c q     (11) 
 
Where:  
(.)p : Market price for aggregate quantity; 
(.)iC :cost function for firm i. 
 
 
5. APPLYING GAME THEORY  TO TEP AND GEP PROBLEM 
 
5.1. Assumptions 
In order to formulate the strategic interaction between GenCo and TransCo in the expansion 
planning game, some assumptions are considered.  
 TransCo is owner of all transmission lines. 
 Power market structure is Poolco-type in which GenCo offers the price and quantity bids to a 
Independent System Operator (ISO). Then, the ISO dispatches the cheapest power considering 
operational constraints like transfer capacity limitations and energy balance constraints.  
 Demand is considered as a constant load.   
 Expansion strategies of TransCo and Genco are discrete.  This means that TransCo can either expand its 
line capacity or maintain the initial transfer capacity of the line.  
 Expansion behaviors of TransCo and GenCo are based on Cournot model. 
 
5.2. Problem Formulation 
As profit maximization is the main purpose of each side of the game theory and profit is the 
difference between revenues and costs, the revenue of the TransCo for each line is given by a congestion 
charge of that line [19] which is the difference between local marginal prices (LMPs) [20-21]. The sum of 
congestion charges of each line is total revenue of TransCo. 
In order to make the problem more simple, Transco total cost is not considered. So, profit of the TransCo can 
be expressed as (12): 
 




   (12) 
 
Where: 
T : profit of the Transco in $/hr;                              
i  : LMP at node i in $/MWhr; 
j : LMP at node j in $/MWhr; 
ijP : Active power flow from node i to node j in MW. 
As GEP is performed at node i, The GenCo profit from GEP is obtained using (13): 
 
( ) ( )G i G GP c P i G     (13) 
 
Where: 
G : profit of GenCo in $/hr; 
i : LMP at node i in $/MWhr; 
GP : active power generation in MW; 
( )Gc P : quadratic cost function of active power generation in $/hr; 
( )i G : investment cost in terms of generation expansion capacity in $/hr. 
 
5.3. Solution Methodology 
The following notations are used in the solution methodology. 
i
TS : i
th expansion strategy of TEP; i= 1,2,...,n; 
j
GS : j
th expansion strategy of GEP; j=1,2,…..,n; 
T :transmission expansion capacity (TEC) in MW; 
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G : Generation expansion capacity (GEC) in MW; 
0T : initial TEC in MW; 
0G : initial GEC in MW; 
T : increment in TEC in MW; 
G : increment in GEC in MW; 
T : maximum TEC in MW; 
G : maximum GEC in MW. 
Algorithm of finding the Nash equilibrium among all possible combinations of expansion strategies 
is shown in flowchart of Figure 7 and the Cournot equilibrium is found by using an iterative search procedure 
[22] as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
6. CASE STUDY 
The proposed algorithm is applied to a six-bus system shown in Figure 9.  The Data of the six-bus 
system is given in Tables 1 to 3. In the proposed method, first the most appropriate bus for load increment is 
selected using minimum singular value technique. The minimum singular value technique shows bus 2 is the 
best and the most suitable bus for load incremental because this state has maximum VSM, this issue is clearly 
shown in Figure 2. Afterwards, in order to supply the incremented load in the selected bus, Game Theory is 




Figure 2. VSM and Min Singular Value of system when load increase at bus2 
 
 
IJECE  ISSN: 2088-8708  









Figure 4. VSM and Min Singular Value of system when load increase at bus4 
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Figure 6. VSM and Min Singular Value of system when load increase at bus6 
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Figure 8. Flowchart of the Cournot solution algorithm 
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Figure 9. Six-bus system 
 
 








G1 50 200 
G2 37.5 68 
G3 45 73 
 
 
Table 2. Line Data 




1 2 0.1 0.2 15.28 
1 4 0.05 0.2 40.32 
1 5 0.08 0.3 30.63 
2 3 0.05 0.25 20.2 
2 4 0.05 0.1 42.6 
2 5 0.1 0.3 31.42 
2 6 0.07 0.2 24.6 
3 5 0.12 0.26 28 
3 6 0.02 0.1 50.4 
4 5 0.2 0.4 18.1 
5 6 0.1 0.3 21.6 
 
 
Table 3. Bus Data 
Bus 









1 Swing 1.05 - - 12.492 
2 Gen. 1.05 0.5 0 11.565 
3 Gen. 1.07 0.6 0 11.877 
4 Load - 0 70 15.674 
5 Load - 0 70 12.939 
6 Load - 0 70 12.206 
 
 
A. Selection of the best bus for load increment 
As shown in Figure 2 the best loadability limit and the most appropriate bus for load increment, is 
bus 2 because in this state loadability limit ( maxP ) and minimum eigenvalue of Jacobean matrix ( min ) of 
power flow equations that is presented in (14) are the most secure state among other states. 
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B. Transmission and Generation Expansion Planning 
After selection of the best bus for load incement, in order to supply the load, Game Theory studies 
the strategic interaction between transmission expansion planning (TEP) and generation expansion planning 
(GEP). 
Under normal operation condition, generator 1 output is 76.5 MW and generator 2 and 3 generate 
their maximum allowable output power. Supposing the 40 MW load (250-210=40 MW) installed at bus 2 and 
as the capacity of line1-2 is 15.28MW, a line congestion occurs. Therefore, in order to supply this load, 
transmission capacity expansion between buses 1 and 2 or generation capacity expansion of generator at bus 
2, is required. As a consequence, a competition occurs between TransCo for the capacity expansion of line 1-
2 and GenCo for the generation expansion capacity of generator at bus 2. Table 4 shows the expansions 
strategies of the two players (TransCo & GenCo) in this case. Equation (12) represents the profit of Transco 
due to congestion in transmission lines, and (13) represents the profit of  GenCo due to expansion of 
generator capacity at bus 2 and 2( )Gc P  for generator 2 is presented in (15). 
 
2( )G G Gc P P P      (15) 
 
0.00889, 10.333, 200     and ( ) 200$ /i G hr  
In the next step, each of these strategies is applied to the system and at each step, the maximum 
profit of each company is obtained. Finally, the most profitable strategy for both player using Game Theory 
and Nash equilibrium is obtained. 
 
 
Table 4. Expansion Strategies of Transco and GenCo 
Symbol Expansion Strategy 
1
TS  TransCo will not expand line 1-2 
2
TS  TransCo will expand line 1-2 
1
GS  GenCo will not expand line 1-2 
2
GS  GenCo will expand line 1-2 
 
 
1) 1st Expansion scenario ( 1 1,T GS S  ) 
In this scenario, neither TransCo nor GenCo expands its capacity, so there is no revenue or cost for 
GenCo and TransCo gains profit from the congestion charges. profits of the two players in this strategy are 
given in Table 5.  
2) 2nd Expansion scenario (
2 1,T GS S ) 
TransCo will expand line 1-2 capacity from 15.28 MW to 55.28 MW in steps of 5 MW. The TEC 
with maximum profit for TransCo is 50.28 MW with profit of 31.03 $/hr. Once again there is no profit for 
GenCo in this scenario. The profits of TransCo and GenCo in this scenario are given in Table 6. 
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20.28 5.64 0 0 
25.28 8.719 0 0 
30.28 11.5 0 0 
35.28 15.4 0 0 
40.28 20.02 0 0 
45.28 25.186 0 0 
50.28 31.03 0 0 
55.28 20.5 0 0 
 
 
3) 3rd Expansion scenario ( 1 2,T GS S ) 
GenCo will perform GEP in bus 2 and the GEC range is from 68 MW to 108 MW in steps of 5 MW. 
The GEC with maximum profit for the GenCo is 30 MW with profit of 290.44 $/hr. In this scenario, TransCo 
gains profit from congestion charges. The profits of TransCo and GenCo in this scenario are given in Table 7. 
 
 














15.28 13.2 5 289.4 
15.28 11.84 10 279.3 
15.28 10.46 15 269.7 
15.28 9.1 20 260.536 
15.28 7.7 25 272.33 
15.28 6.39 30 290.44 
15.28 5.03 35 275.3 
15.28 3.67 40 262.1 
 
 
4) 4th  Expansion scenario ( 2 2,T GS S ) 
Both TransCo and GenCo will perform TEC and GEC. The most profitable expansion capacity is 37 
MW for TEP with profit of 32.03 $/hr and 32 MW for GEP with profit of 291.43  $/hr. So the Cournot 
capacity pair with maximum profit is (32 MW, 37 MW) among all other Cournot capacity pairs. The profits 
of TransCo and GenCo are given in Table 8. 
 
 














32 31.05 28 261.78 
35 30.02 30 288.52 
37 32.03 32 291.43 
 
 
After considering all of the mentioned scenarios, a payoff matrix that comprises the payoffs of 
TransCo and GenCo is constructed which is shown in Table 9. In Table 9, the first entry in the box is the 
profit of TransCo and the second entry is the profit of GenCo. In this case, the dominant strategy which is 
characterized as the Nash equilibrium is the pair of strategies ( 2 2,T GS S ) which implies that the most profitable 
strategy for both TransCo and GenCo is to perform TEP and GEP. In this strategy, the profit of TransCo is 
32.03 $/hr while GenCo profit is 291.43 $/hr.  
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Table 9. Payoff Matrix of the Game Theoretic TEC and GEC 










TS  (14.3,0) (6.39,290.44) 
2




In this study it was shown a new method for expansion planning of generation and transmission that 
considered static security of the system such as voltage security margin And loadability limit in a six-bus 
system. At the first step a secure bus was selected for load incrimination that was considered voltage security 
margine by using minimum singular value technique. As the transmission line capacity is not sufficient for 
the load increment, a congestion in the transmission line occurs which can be an incentive for GenCo and 
TransCo to gain the maximum profit from supplying this load. Considering multiple scenarios, the Cournot 
model defines the most profitable TEC and GEC in each scenario. After constituting the payoff matrix which 
includes all of the possible strategies combination, the Nash equilibrium is obtained. The results show that 
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(.)f : total operation cost in $/hr 
igB : generation offering price for each generation offering energy in $/MWhr 
igP : active power generation for each generation offering energy in MW 
maxiP : maximum active power generation for each generation offering energy in MW 
ijP : active power flow from bus i to bus j in MW 
ijY : admittance of branch connecting bus i and bus j in Ω 
ij : admittance angle of branch connecting bus i and bus j in radian 
iV : voltage at bus i in volt 
i : voltage angle at bus i in radian 
minijP : minimum active power transmission capacity at branch ij 
maxijP : maximum active power transmission capacity at branch ij 
minijQ : minimum reactive power transmission capacity at branch ij 
maxijQ : maximum reactive power transmission capacity at branch ij 
miniV : minimum voltage at bus i in volt 
maxiV : maximum voltage at bus i in volt 
mini : minimum voltage angle at bus i in radian 
maxi : maximum voltage angle at bus i in radian 
Load iP : load at bus i 
 
